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There is a long-standing belief that landlords and capitalists have used their control over the 
means of production to direct the development and adoption of technologies which , ave 
increased their welfare at the expense of workers. There is also a wide-spread belief that the 
interlinkage between credit and tenancy markets, which seems so prevalent in LDCs, provides 
further impetus to the resistance of innovations: innovations which make tenants better off 
reduce their demand for loans, and thus make landlords (qua creditors) worse-off. These 
contentions have typically been dismissed out of hand by standard welfare economics arguments. 
The rural environment of most LDCs may not, however, be adequately described by the 
standard economic model on which this welfare analysis is based. In particular, in many LDCs 
sharecropping contracts are widely employed; there is evidence of widespread unemployment, 
and there is not the full set of (risk and capital) markets required by the competitive paradigm. 
The objective of this paper is to show under quite general conditions that the institutional 
structure of the economy may indeed be an important determinant of whether a particular 
innovation will or will not be adopted. We show that: 
(i) landlords may wish to - and can - resist innovations which unambiguously increase 
production whenever sharecropping contracts are employed, 
(ii) conversely, landlords may adopt innovations which not only lower the welfare of workers, 
but even lower net national product, 
(iii) the presence of interlinkage may, indeed, affect the adoption of a new technology; however, 
the reason for this is only partly related to the effect of innovations on tenants' borrowing. 
Indeed, we show that innovations may increase as well as decrease the tenants' demand for 
borrowing. 
1. Introduction 
There is a long-standing belief that landlords and capitalists have used 
their control over the means of production to direct the development and 
*The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their 
affiliated organizations. We thank David Newbery, T.N. Srinivasan, Russ Krelove, In-Koo Cho, 
Erika Jorgensen, anonymous referees, and in particular D. Abreu for many helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the European 
Congress of the Econometric Society in Pisa, Italy, 1983. 
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adoption of technologies which have increased their welfare at the expense of 
workers. Although workers may be better-off than they used to be, they are 
not as well-off as they might have been had they assumed control of the 
innovation process. 
There is also a widespread belief that the interlinkage between credit and 
tenancy markets, t which seems so prevalent in LDCs, provides further 
impetus to the resistance of innovations: innovations which make tenants 
better-off reduce their demand for loans, and thus make landlords (qua 
creditors) worse-off. 2
These contentions have typically been dismissed out of hand by standard 
welfare economics arguments. An innovation is defined as a shift outward in 
the production possibilities chedule, or equivalently, as an outward shift in 
the utility possibilities chedule. Then, if the economy is competitive, at the 
old equilibrium level of utility of workers, it pays each landlord to adopt the 
innovation. In doing so, landlords may increase their demand for tenants, 
and as a result, in the new equilibrium, they may be worse-off. Still, it is in 
the interest of each competitive landlord to adopt the innovation. Alterna- 
tively, if the landlords act collusively, say as a single monopsonist, hey will 
push the tenants to the subsistence l vel. Again, it will always pay them to 
adopt the innovation. Thus, while in a 
never disadvantageous to an individual 
environments, innovations advantageous 
perfect monopoly, innovations are 
landlord; in perfectly competitive 
to an individual landlord, which 
when the general equilibrium effects are taken into account are disadvan- 
tageous to landlords as a group, cannot be effectively resisted. 
The rural environment of most LDCs may not, however, be adequately 
described by the standard economic model on which this welfare analysis is 
based. In particular, in many LDCs, sharecropping contracts are widely 
employed; there is evidence of widespread unemployment, and there is not 
1For an excellent survey of the phenomena of interlinked markets, see Bardhan (1980) and 
also Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984). Elsewhere, we provide an economic rationale for 
interlinkage, derived from the general theory of moral hazard [Braverman-Stiglitz (1982)-I. For 
other theoretical discussions of interlinkage, see BelI-Zusman (1980), Braverman-Srinivasan 
( 1981 ), Braverman--Guasch (1984) and Mitra (1983). 
-'See, for instance, Bhaduri I1973, 1979). Bhaduri, noting the interlinkage between credit, land 
and labor markets to which we referred earlier, has argued that landlords resist innovations 
because these typically reduce the demand for tenants' credit, and hence landlords' profits. 
Newbery (1975}, Braverman-Stiglitz (1982) and Mitra (1983) have questioned the exploitation 
explanation for interlinkage that Bhaduri has put forward. Srinivasan (1979), using Bhaduri's 
model, has argued against Bhaduri's contention that innovations lead to lesser demand for 
credit. As we show below the demand for credit may either increase or decrease as a result of an 
innovation, but whether landlords are better- or worse-off as a result of an innovation does not 
depend solely on the effect of the innovation on the demand for credit. A decrease in tenants' 
demand for credit is neither necessary nor sufficient for landlords to resist innovations. Newbery 
(1975) called attention to the need to focus on moral hazard issues in analyzing resistance to 
technological innovations. He provided an example in which technological innovation would be 
resisted by monopsonist landlords. 
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the full set of (risk and capital) markets required by the competitive 
paradigm. 3 
The objective of this paper is to show under quite general conditions that 
the institutional structure of the economy may indeed be an important 
determinant of whether a particular innovation will or will not be adopted. 4 
We show that: 
(i) landlords may wish to - and can - resist innovations which unam- 
biguously increase production whenever sharecropping contracts are 
employed, 
(ii) conversely, landlords may adopt innovations which not only lower the 
welfare of workers, but even lower net national product, 
(iii) the presence of interlinkage may, indeed, affect the adoption of a new 
technology; however, the reason for this is only partly related to the 
effect of innovations on tenants' borrowing. Indeed, we show that 
innovations may increase as well as decrease the tenants' demand for 
borrowing. 
, Though widespread unemployment is common in many LDCs, we do not 
address this fact here. In a sequel to this paper [Braverman-Stiglitz (1985)-I 
we argue that the mere presence of unemployment (even under a pure wage 
system) may be sufficient o generate resistance by landlords and employers 
to the adoption of superior technological innovations. 
2. Sharecropping and the adoption of technological innovations 
Traditional welfare analysis has equated an outward shift in the produc- 
tion possibilities chedule with an outward shift in the utilities possibilities 
schedule. Under traditional economic assumptions, the two are, in fact, 
equivalent. But whenever factors do not get paid their full marginal product, 
the two may not be equivalent. Such is the case with sharecropping 
contracts. 5 The change in technology may increase output for each level of 
3The impact of innovations on the marginal costs of landlords and on the utilities of tenants 
and landlords has also been analyzed in the context of the economic history of the U.S. rural 
South; e.g., Reid (1976) and Alston (1983) discuss the impact of technology on southern 
landlords' attitude towards harecropping. 
"~For most of the analysis, we do not discuss the costs of innovation. We envisage an 
invention which has occurred and ask under what conditions will the invention be adopted. It is 
straightforward to modify our analysis to take account of the costs of innovation, provided we 
have a well-defined theory of how those costs are to be shared. 
SThe contract need not be a pure sharecropping contract; there may, for instance, be a fixed 
rent or wage component to the tenancy agreement. I  should be clear that the argument applies 
to any principal-agent problem in which the principal (e.g., landlord) bears some of the risk and 
hence the agent (e.g., tenant) does not bear the full consequences of his actions. 
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input; but at the same time, it may exacerbate the incentive problem. As a 
result, even a competitive landlord may not wish to adopt the innovation. 
The objective of this paper is to identify circumstances in which, with 
sharecropping, innovations (in the technological sense) will not be adopted. 
The analysis is divided into two stages: 
(i) Fixed contract. Under what conditions will landlords be worse-off when 
the terms of the contract between the landlord and tenant remain unchanged? 
The answer to this question determines whether, if landlords could resist 
an innovation, they would do so /f the terms of the contract could not be 
altered (e.g., if they were fixed by social norms). 
(ii) Variable contracts: fixed expected utility. The terms of the contract may, 
of course, change. The standard formulation of the competitive quilibrium 
with sharecropping [e.g., Stiglitz (1974)] has the terms of the contract chosen 
to maximize the expected utility of the landlord, given a level of expected 
utility of the tenant. 6 The change in the technology will thus induce a change 
in the terms of the contract, and the question is, when these adjustments are 
taken into account, under what conditions will landlords still be worse-off? 
The conditions derived in this section are important, because they not only 
determine when innovations will not be adopted in competitive nviron- 
ments, but they also show when innovations will not be adopted under non- 
competitive conditions. A monopsony landlord may be modelled as maximiz- 
ing his expected utility, subject o the subsistence constraint of his workers. 
Partial vs. general equilibrium analysis 
It is important o emphasize that even if landlords do not resist innova- 
tions, i.e., each believes that his expected utility will be increased by its 
adoption, in the general equilibrium, landlords may be worse-off. Under 
these circumstances, collusion may be required for landlords to resist 
innovation. In small villages with few landlords the possibility of collusion 
(tacit or explicit) is very plausible [e.g., Rudra (1982)]. This collusion may be 
enforced by a variety of social and economic sanctions [see Akerlof (1980)]. 
The conditions under which landlords will voluntarily adopt disadvan- 
tageous innovations are discussed in subsection 2.4 below. The possibility of 
such innovations has, of course, long been recognized [see, e.g., Hicks 
(1963)]. What distinguishes our analysis from Hicks' is that we emphasize the 
implications of imperfect supervision technology and limited risk markets on 
the general equilibrium effects. Hicks deals only with perfectly competitive 
and perfectly monitored wage labor markets. Whether landlords can restrict 
the adoption of a new technique depends also on whether the tenants' use of 
°The landlord is an 'expected utility' taker, rather than a price (wage) taker. 
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the technique can be observed, and, if so, whether the contractual arrange- 
ments between the landlord and tenant allow the landlords to specify what 
technologies the tenant may employ. 
Before using calculus we present a simple example illustrating why, with 
sharecropping, innovations may not be adopted. 
2.1. An example 
To make the example as simple as possible, we ignore uncertainty and, 
initially, assume that the terms of the contract are  f ixed.  7 
Consider the technological change represented in figs. l a and lb. In the 
old technique, denoted by f(e), the marginal return to effort was very high 
up to e*, and that is the level of effort supplied by the tenant. The new 
technology, denoted by f(e), though unambigously better than the old, has 
diminishing returns set in at a much lower level of effort and at a lower level 
of output. The tenant now operates at e**. As a result, the landlord is worse- 
off. This is true even when the share of the tenant, ~, is lowered to leave the 
tenant just as well-off as before (see fig. lb). s Landlords, in this case, would 
like to restrict the adoption of the new technique. Note that no collusive 
action is required and in the particular instance drawn in figs. l a and l b, 
national output is increased by this resistance to new technology, at the 
expense of tenants' welfare. 9
This example shows that there may be improvements to the land which 
increase tenants' productivity but lower the net returns to land. These would 
clearly not be adopted by landlords. They would be if tenants owned their 
own land. Tenants might even be willing to pay for the improvements 
themselves, if their tenure on a particular plot of land was secure, but not 
otherwise, (and the latter seems to be the prevalent situation in many 
LDCs). 1 o 
2.2. A general argument: Fixed contract 
More generally, with a sharecropping contract, the tenant's problem is 
max EU(af(e, T, f2, 0), e) = V(f2; ~, T), 
{el 
(1) 
Tin the absence of uncertainty, it is hard to justify the employment of sharecropping 
relationships, so long as effort is variable. This assumption is employed to simplify the 
exposition; as the discussion below makes clear, nothing critical depends on this assumption. 
SOther terms of the contract (such as plot size) might also adjust. See, e.g., Stiglitz (1974), 
Newbery-Stiglitz (1979), Braverman-Srinivasan (1981), Braverman-Stiglitz (1982) and the dis- 
cussion below. 
9Ordinary national product measures evaluate only output and do not include effort 
evaluation which enters the tenant's utility. 
t°Alternatively, our analysis can be interpreted as showing that there is an important set of 
"welfare' enhancing innovations which it would never pay landlords to adopt. 
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Meon 
outout 
e '"  e" effort---e 
Fig. la. Comparison of the new technology, f ,  with the old one, f .  
- -  f(e) 
( 1 --G') f (e" )  < (1 - -~ ' )  f(e')-or G'> 1 - -  ( I - -a)  f(e'), 
S~e-- )
Tenant's l income Yw 
~f~(~.i) [_ ~ e )  
e'" e" e 
af(e) 
World Bank--27163 
Fig. lb. Tenant's choice of effort under the old and new (adjusted) share contracts; (~ and 
respectively), for a given level of expected utility F*. Note that if the tenant is to be indifferent,. 
> ~, where if the landlord is worse-off 
(1-~)f(e**) <(1-~)f(e*) or ,~> 1-(1-~)(f(e*)/f(e**)). 
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where ~=share of tenant, T=plot  size, e=tenant's effort, 11 f=(value of) 
output 12 in state 0 with technology f2, effort e, and plot size T, and U = U(YW, e) 
is the tenant's utility function, which depends on his income, yw=~f, and 
his effort, e, with the usual properties. 13 
The equilibrium contract is described by {~, T}. 
The landlord is assumed to be sufficiently wealthy and provided with a 
sufficient number of alternatives to diversify his risk portfolio, so that he can 
be represented as risk-neutral; he maximizes his expected income, 
r r~(1-  ot)Ef. (2) 
We shall be concerned with changes in technology which, in a purely 
technological sense, are unambiguous improvements, i.e., 
.[~ > 0 for all 0, e and T. (3) 
In every state of nature, for any pre-specified level of effort and plot size, 
output is higher with the new technology than with the old, so that the new 
technology - in a technological sense - dominates the old. It is obvious that 
for such technologies, with a fixed contract, tenants are unambiguously 
better-off, i.e., 
? V(O; ~, T) 
>0. (4) 
Straightforward differentiation of landlord profits shows that 
t?rc 8(1 -- ~)EJ' - (1 - a) ( ~ t 3 e )  
?a-  Ef, +EL o , 
and landlords will resist the innovation if 
(5) 
?e  Efu ,4 
~a > E--~ (6) 
11 e can represent a vector of inputs of the tenant. 
t2For most of the analysis we assume that the price of output of agricultural goods is fixed. 
Hence, we let it be equal to unity, and f becomes physical output. 
13U~.>O, Uyr<0, U~<0, U~<0,  U is a quasi-concave. 
~4This formulation assumes that the effort decision is made before 0 is known. If it is made 
after 0 is known, condition (5) becomes 
f~ t~e Efu 
E - - - ->  
EL ea EL' 
i.e., the weighted average ffort response must be greater than some critical amount. 
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With a sufficiently large negative effort response on the part of tenants, 
landlords will be worse-off at the old contract, and thus resist the innovation. 
The magnitude of 0e/0[2 depends both on the properties of the tenant's 
utility function and on how the innovation changes the technology. For 
instance, if the utility function is separable of the form 
then ~ 5 
where 
U = u(Y") - v(e), (7) 
1 (c]e)[ {Em(f~a/f~)-R(fa/f)} 
e ~-~ ,,= "y+Em{R~-r/} ' 
m-u'LlEu'L, ~-  Le/f ,  '7- je~e/L. 
(8) 
7=_v"e/v ' denotes the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort and R-  
-u"Y ' /u '  denotes the measure of relative risk aversion. The effect on effort 
depends not only on how the innovation affects output, fa, but also on how 
the innovation affects the marginal return to effort, fet~, as our earlier 
example illustrated. 16 There are, as usual, two effects: an income effect, which 
if leisure is normal leads to a reduction in effort, and is greater the greater is 
the individual's risk aversion, R, and the greater is the proportionate upward 
shift in the production function, f t J f ;  and a substitution effect, which can be 
of either sign. If the innovation reduces the marginal product of effort (as in 
our example), i.e., J~<0,  then this too leads to a reduction in effort. Thus, 
landlords resist an innovation if it reduces the marginal return to effort by a 
sufficiently large amount. 1v 
We now show that landlords will adopt an innovation if and only if it 
increases national income (taking into account he effort response of tenants). 
15This follows by differentiating the tenant's first order condition for effort, o~Eu'fe =v'. 
16Note that the denominator of (8) is always positive from the second order condition. 
~7AIternative sufficient conditions for the landlord to resist innovation can also be derived. As 
R becomes large, 
& -Eq, f,¢f 
.~ where ~k ~ Ru'fe. 
~?f2 E~b f~/ f
Thus, if f = h(O)g(e, T, f2), then 
& - fn  
~a L '  
and the landlord is indifferent o the innovation. If R is constant, and f =/i(0, T, f2)Z(e), then the 
innovation lowers landlord's welfare if 
E h°u'fJh Eh~ > - -  
Eu'~ Eh ' 
e.g., if hhea/hohe < R. 
A. Braverman and J.E. Stiglitz, Landlords, tenants, technological innovations 321 
The effect of an innovation on national income is simply given by 
,9, 
But this coincides precisely with condition (6), and the result is immediate. 
(Note that the level of landlord's hare, 1-~t, affects the innovation adoption 
only indirectly.) 
At the same time, it is apparent hat landlords resist innovations which 
may decrease their welfare only slightly, but increase that of tenants 
enormously; if the adoption of the innovation were controlled by a govern- 
ment which maximizes national welfare, such innovations would be adopted, 
provided some weight is attached to the gain of tenants. 18 
2.3. Landlord's profits at fixed expected utility of tenants 
The argument above establishes that if the terms of the contract are fixed 
by law or custom (as they often are), 19 then, in the short run, landlords will 
resist the innovation, until appropriate adjt/stments can be made to the 
contract. 
The relevant question for the longer run analysis, where the terms of the 
contract are adjustable, is whether, when the terms of the contract are 
adjusted to leave tenants indifferent, will landlords be better-off. We es- 
tablished earlier that at the old terms, innovations always make tenants 
better-off. Hence, if the expected utility of tenants is to remain unchanged, 
the share of tenants or the plot size must be lowered. The change in 
technology then has three effects on landlords: (a) the direct effect of an 
increase in output, which increases landlords' income, (b) the direct effect of 
the adjustment in the contract, which will make landlords better-off, and (c) 
the effect of the adjustment of effort both to the change in technology and to 
the compensating adjustment in the contract. This is of ambiguous ign, the 
"substitution' effect from the lower share leads to lower levels of effort while 
the change in technology itself may increase the marginal return to effort. 
Since the landlord always adjusts the terms of the contract in such a way 
that the total effect of the adjustment is to make himself better-off, the 
landlord is less likely to resist innovations if he is able to adjust the terms of 
the contract han if he is not. 
l SSince the terms of the contract are fixed, landlords will resist the adoption of some 
innovations which would be Pareto improvements if the terms of the contract could be adjusted, 
e.g., if lump sum transfer payments may be made between workers and landlords. 
19Output shares in LDCs are often found to be fixed at 50:50. 
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Analytically, instead of (5) we obtain 
dn dT da de 
(10) 
Direct Direct effect Effect of 
effect of of change of change in 
technology contract effort 
The general derivation of d~/dOle, dT/dOle and de/dOle is complicated. For 
our present purpose, we limit ourselves to the special case where technology 
is such that there is an 'efficient' plot size which remains unaltered by the 
change in O, 2° and where utility is separable. Then, 
and 
I _ ~xEu' fo¢ Eu'f <0 (1 l) 
de I _ ae ae d~] 
:~[(Eu"J'~f $+ u' f~) - (Eu '  f~/Eu' f )  " E(u' + au"f) f~] 
v"-=E{u"f~=+u'f,e} 
(12) 
It is clear that there are changes in technology which have a large effect 
(locally) on the marginal return to effort (lea is large) but which at the same 
time, have a small (positive) effect on output (fa is small). These changes will 
thus induce a larger reduction in effort, cause only a small adjustment in the 
terms of the contract (note that d~/dO depends only on the magnitude of f~, 
not on lea), and hence make landlords unambiguously worse-off. This is 
precisely the ease depicted earlier in fig. lb. 
It should be noted that nowhere in the analysis so far have we made use 
of the competitive hypothesis. Hence our analysis is equally applicable to the 
2°Formally, the optimal contract is the solution to the problem 
Max(I-~)EJ'[e(~,T,[2), T, fL0] s.t. V(Q;~,T)>P, 
i.e., {2, T} solves the following pair of equations: 
ae ¢?e . -Ef +(I- ~)[E f,~-~-(J~, r----~+ J"'~V~I=OjvT_] 
and 
V(~2; ~, T) = V. 
d~/dt~ and dT/dt2 are found by straightforward implicit differentiation f (i) and (ii). 
(i) 
(ii) 
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competitive landlord who takes as given the expected utility which his 
contract must provide to tenants (in order to obtain tenants) as it does to 
monopsonist landlords, who push their tenants down to the subsistence 
expected utility level. 
In this section we have established that when there are incentive problems 
(as arise in the context of sharecropping), an innovation which unam- 
biguously increases output for each level of input may yet shift a segment of 
the utility possibilities chedule inward, i.e., at certain prespecified levels of 
expected utility of tenants, landlords are worse-off. In fig. 2 and 3 we provide 
two such examples. In the first example (fig. 2), the whole utility possibilities 
frontier shifts inward due to the new innovation. Therefore, the innovation 
will be rejected, both by a monopsonist landlord, who drives the workers 
down to their subsistence l vel, and in a competitive quilibrium. 
Perhaps more interesting is the second example (fig. 3) where the new 
utility possibilities schedule crosses the old. In the case illustrated this 
innovation will be rejected by the monopsonist, but would be adopted in the 
competitive nvironment. 
Finally, we note that in contrast o the results of section 2.2 I-compare (10) 
to (5) and (9)], if the terms of the contract are adjustable, the decision of the 
landlord to adopt an innovation does not coincide with whether the 
innovation increases national income (taking into account he adjustment of 
the terms of the contract). There are innovations which lower national income 
but which still will be adopted (because they enable the landlord to lower the 





OId utility possibilities 
ntier with sharecropping 
~ ~ ~ /mon i to r ing  
N ~ N / ffonti~ with costless .>x ' ,   on..or.o0 
New utility possibilities ~ • ~ 
Expected utility of landlords EU L 
Fig. 2. A case in which innovation under sharecropping shifts the whole utility possibilities 
frontiers inward. 
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Subsistence 
level 
EUT L r = Utility possibilities frontier 
I ~  before innovation 
~ ~ C  I - ompetitive equilibria 
~4 ~k~ "~ ~lx"l'~'7~x0 ~ Utility possibilities 
~ ~  tront,er after ,nnovat,on 
EU L 
World Bank--271~ 
Fig. 3. A case in which the utility possibilities frontiers cross; monopolist resists innovation 
which is adopted in competitive economy. 
2.4. General equilibrium impact of innovation 
The fact that a landlord finds it in his interest o adopt the innovation in a 
competitive conomy (where the landlord takes the level of expected utility of 
tenants as given) does not mean that when all landlords adopt the 
innovation, landlords will be better-off. How the gains to an innovation are 
/ 
distributed between the landlords and tenants, in equilibrium, will depend on 
how the innovation affects the demand for tenants, or, equivalently, how the 
innovatmn affects the equilibrium plot size. If at the old level of expected 
utility of tenants, the optimal plot size is increased, then demand for tenants 
will decrease, and tenants will be worse-off with the innovation; 21 all the 
gains accrue to the landlords; if, in contrast, at the old level of expected 
income (utility) of landlords, the optimal plot size is reduced, then landlords 
will be worse-off with the innovation. However, in a competitive nviron- 
ment, although they might wish to resist the innovation, they can only do so 
through collusive actions. Hence it will pay each landlord to adopt the new 
technology. 
The conditions under which an innovation will lead to an increase in the 
demand for labor (smaller plot sizes) may be derived as a straightforward 
21This assumes that the supply of tenants is not perfectly elastic. If the supply is perfectly 
elastic, clearly, F remains unchanged, and the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium effects 
coincide. The change in plot size simply affects the number of tenant farmers [see Braverman- 
Srinivasan (1981) for such a model]. 
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extension of the analysis of Braverman-Stiglitz (1982). For our purposes, it is 
sufficient o note that a critical determinant of the effect of the innovation on 
plot size is the magnitude of J~.~ i.e., whether the innovation increases or 
decreases the marginal return to (larger) plot size: while in the traditional 
analysis the sign of fra would be the sole determinant of the general 
equilibrium impact of the innovation on landlords, here the general equilib- 
rium effect depends as well on how the innovation affects the marginal return 
to effort and the share compensated effort response from a change in plot 
size, i.e., the technology of supervision and the contractual framework are 
also critical in assessing the general equilibrium effects. 
3. interlinkage and the adoption of innovations 
In this section, we address the question of whether the fact that landlords 
are frequently also lenders to their tenants makes it more or less likely that 
landlords will wish, or be able, to resist innovations. It has, for instance, been 
argued [Bhaduri (1973)] that increases in the income of tenants will reduce 
their need for borrowing; since the iandlord-cum-lenders make high rates of 
return on their loans, this will lower their profits. Landlord-cum-lenders will, 
it is thus argued, resist innovations.-Srinivasan (1979), on the other hand, has 
demonstrated that Bhaduri's results require that loans be inferior goods. If 
they are normal, an increase in income on the part of tenants will increase 
the demand for loans, and this will increase the income of the landlord-cum- 
lenders. 
We argue here that the conclusion - that interlinkage of credit and 
tenancy markets (like other important aspects of the institutional organiza- 
tion of agriculture) has an important effect on innovation - is correct, but 
the lines of argument by which earlier studies reached that conclusion are 
either incorrect, or incomplete. In particular, we shall show: 
(i) The earlier analyses of the effect of technological change on borrowing, 
though correct in noting that changes in technology could have a significant 
effect on borrowing by tenants, improperly treated the demand for loans by 
ignoring uncertainty; in contrast, we argue that the demand for loans which 
is a derived demand and which depends on the relationship between present 
and future income, is critically affected by the stochastic properties of future 
income. Thus, under quite plausible assumptions concerning the nature of 
the utility functions of tenants and the nature of the innovation, innovations 
may either increase or decrease the demand for borrowing. The basic line of 
the argument is provided below, while mathematical demonstration of 
sufficient conditions for results in both directions are presented in our earlier 
working paper [Braverman-Stiglitz (1983a)]. 
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(ii) An analysis of the effect of the innovation on the demand for loans is 
neither necessary nor sufficient o determine the impact of interlinkage on the 
adoption of innovations. Elsewhere [Braverman-Stiglitz (1982)], we showed 
that one possible explanation for interlinkage is that, under sharecropping, 
the amount borrowed affects the landlord's return (through its effect both on 
the individual's effort and on his decisions concerning choices of technique), 
and conversely, the terms of the landlord's contract affect the returns to the 
lender (through its effect on the likelihood of default). Interlinkage was a 
method by which these 'externalities' could be internalized. But if there are 
important interactions of the kind just described, then what is of concern to 
the landlord-cum-lender is the total impact of the innovation on his income; 
the decomposition of his income into return as a lender, or return as a 
landlord, has no particular significance. It is clear, however, that the impact 
of an innovation on a landlord-cum-lender may be quite different from the 
impact of the same innovation on a landlord who does not control the 
borrowing activities of his tenants. 
We now turn to a more detailed examination of each of these points. 
3.1. The adoption of innovations in interlinked markets 
To ascertain the effect of an innovation on a landlord-cum-lender in an 
interlinked market, we employ an extension of the simple model developed in 
section 2. There, we assumed that the landlord cannot control effort directly, 
and because tenants receive only a fraction of their marginal product, they 
will have insufficient incentives for exerting themselves. We assumed that 
effort was a function of the share they rece ived.  22 Here, we assume [following 
Braverman-Stiglitz (1982)] that borrowing too has an effect on effort, while 
the amount tenants borrow, B, will, in turn, be affected by the terms of the 
loan contract. For simplicity, we shall assume that landlords have only one 
instrument in the capital market - the rate of interest which they charge on a 
loan. 23 Thus, if increased borrowing leads to increased effort, the landlord 
may attempt o encourage borrowing (by charging a lower interest rate) and 
conversely, if increased borrowing leads to reduced effort. 
We thus write the income of the landlord-cum-lender as 
~z --( 1 - g)Ef(e, 12) + (r - p)B (13) 
22Effort is also a function of the plot size, which, for simplicity, we take as fixed for purposes 
of the present analysis. 
231n our earlier study, we showed that if the landlord could, he might wish to employ non- 
iinear loan schedules. 
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and 
c~e dr ) de de dB __ 
dn - (1-~)Efu+(1- -~)Ef~ --~+ c~B d---~ + c~r 
d12 
dB dr 
+ (r-  o)-d-~ + B- ~ ,  (14) 
where 
dB aB ~B dr 
+ (15) 
dr2 O~ ~r dr2' 
and where p is the opportunity cost of funds to the landlord, r is the rate of 
interest charged, 2+ and effort, e, is viewed as a function of the technology, t2, 
the level of indebtedness, B and the rate of interest charged, i.e., e(t], B, r). 
The effect of a change in technology now depends on whether the landlord 
can adjust the interest rate. We start by focusing our remarks on the case 
where the rate of interest charged is fixed so the terms in dr/dt~ are set at 
zero. The change in technology has (i) a direct effect, (ii) an indirect effect 
through an adjustment in effort (which again is ambiguous in sign), and (iii) 
an indirect effect through an adjustment in the demand for credit. The latter 
has two distinct effects. First, there is a direct effect, which may be positive or 
negative, both because the effect on the demand for loans is ambiguous, and 
because the interest rate charged may be greater or less than the opportunity 
cost of capital. Secondly, the level of indebtedness has an effect on effort 
which too is ambiguous in sign; elsewhere we have analyzed the determinants 
of this effect [Braverman-Stiglitz (1982)]. 
Because the landlord-cum-lender will always adjust the interest rate he 
charges so that the total effect (taking into account the adjustment of effort) 
will be to increase his profits, it is more likely that an innovation will be 
adopted if the interest rate can be varied than if it cannot. On the other 
hand contrasting (14) and (5) it is clear that an innovation which increases a
landlord's income might lower that of a landlord-cum-lender, and conversely. 
Note, in particular that if the rate of interest charged on loans to tenants is 
the same as the rate of return which they can obtain elsewhere, then, of 
course, it makes no difference whether the technological innovation leads to 
2+Eq. (13) implicitly assumes the probability of default is zero. More generally, we write 
H=( I  -~,) Ef(e, t2)+ [f~e, f2,fl, r)-p]B, 
where P is the expected return from a loan of size B bearing an interest rate r to individual 
exerting effort e, with technology [2. Of course, e itself is a function of the terms of the other 
parameters of the problem. The share at and plot size T also actually affect both effort and the 
probability of default (and hence P, given r) but we take n and T as given, and here suppress the 
dependence of P and e on ~t and T. 
328 A. Braverman and J.E. Stiglitz, Landlords, tenants, technological innovations 
an increase or decrease in borrowing, provided that borrowing does not have 
an indirect effect on effort. If the tenant borrows from the landlord because 
he gives him favorable terms (i.e., the terms of the typical tenancy contract 
do not restrict the tenant's rights to borrow elsewhere) the rate of interest 
charged by the landlord must be less than or equal to those charged 
elsewhere, 25 i.e., p>r. Hence, though we agree with Bhaduri that a reduction 
in the demand for loans is a real possibility, the direct effect of this reduction 
is perhaps as likely to increase landlords' profits as it is to reduce them. 
In short, a landlord's incentives for adopting innovations may be enhanced 
or diminished by interlinking. 
Just as before, where we showed that a technological change with 
observability could shift the utility possibilities curve outward, but with 
costly monitoring, it chould shift it inward, so too here: with interlinkage, the 
utilities possibilities chedule might be shifted one way, without it, it could be 
shifted the other. Interlinking makes it more likely, however, that measured 
national income will be increased as a result of the adoption of any 
innovation. In the absence of interlinkage, there is always the possibility that 
innovations which increase the income of the landlord, at the expense of 
lenders might be adopted. 26 Similarly, it is possible that innovations which 
increase the income of a lender-cum-landlord, ecrease the income of 
landlords in non-interlinked markets, and thus will not be adopted. By 
internalizing these potential externalities, interlinking may be expected to 
result in a welfare gain. 27 
3.2. The determination of tenants' borrowing 28 
Eq. (14) demonstrates that a critical determinant of the effect of an 
innovation on the profitability of the landlord-cum-lender was the effect of a 
change in technology on the demand for borrowing. We asserted that, even 
for well behaved changes in technology and well behaved utility functions, 
this could be of either sign. The basic argument is the following. 
The objective of borrowing is to smooth income between different periods. 
2SThis argument is not perfectly persuasive: if landlords are more informed concerning the 
risk characteristics of their tenants than others, and if the capital market is risk averse, then a 
tenant who borrows from the open market may have to pay a risk premium. Hence, it is 
possible that, the opportunity cost for the landlord, P, is less than r, the rate of interest charged 
by the landlord, even though r is less than the rate of interest which the tenant can obtain 
elsewhere. 
26That is, we now need to expand the utility possibility schedule to include lenders as well as 
tenants and landlords. 
27As always, in second best analysis internalizing one set of externalities may exacerbate other 
inefficiencies. 
eSwe are concerned here mainly with borrowing for consumption credit, which as the focus of 
the Bhaduri-$rinivasan debate. However, Braverman-Stiglitz (1982) present a formulation which 
points out how the analysis can be extended to cover production credit. 
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Consider a two period model. If an individual has an abnormally low income 
in the first period, then he will borrow, in anticipation of having a higher 
income the next period. (Since there is uncertainty about next period's 
income, there is, of course, some chance that next period will be even worse 
than this.) Changes in the distribution of income affect both the likelihood of 
a low (say below mean) income this period, and the likelihood of that next 
period; they also have income effects, which affect the individual's willingness 
to accept different risks. Whether, on average, borrowing will be increased or 
decreased, depends both on the nature of the change in the probability 
distribution of output and on the tenant's utility function. 29 In our working 
paper [Braverman-Stiglitz (1983a)] we show that a uniform increase in 
output decreases borrowing if individuals have decreasing absolute risk 
aversion and the rate of interest exceeds the pure rate of time preference and 
if the variance of output is small; on the other hand, a mean preserving 
spread in the distribution of output increases the level of borrowing if the 
utility function is quadratic but with other plausible utility functions, it may 
be decreased. The formal procedure by which to analyze the effect of change 
in technology on the demand for credit is presented in the appendix. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that there may be some truth in the widespread 
view that landlords may wish to, and can, resist innovations, changes in 
technology which increase the amount of output that can be obtained from 
any given input. The institutional structure of the LDCs may, indeed, be an 
important determinant of whether a particular innovation is or is not 
adopted. Although such changes will, under the conventional assumptions 
concerning costless monitoring of workers, result in an unambiguous out- 
ward shift in the utility possibilities chedule, when monitoring is costly and 
contracts involve some form of sharecropping such innovations may result in 
segments of the utility possibilities chedule moving inward. 
We have also argued that the presence of interlinkages between credit and 
land markets does not necessarily imply either resistance or encouragement 
to the adoption of technological innovations. Either case is possible. It might 
actually encourage the adoption of some technologies which otherwise would 
not be adopted, even though the effect of this innovation is to reduce tenants' 
demand for credit. Whether the demand for credit itself is increased or 
decreased turns out to depend critically both on how the technical change 
29It depends on the value of the first four derivatives ofthe utility function, as well as on the 
nature of the change in the distribution ofoutput. 
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affects the probability distribution of yields and on tenants' utility 
functions. 3° 
The analysis of this paper suggests that the question of the adoption of 
new technologies is a far more complicated and subtle question than 
traditional welfare analyses might suggest. 
Although we address here the issues of the adoption of innovation within 
the context of agriculture in a less developed country, it should be clear that 
very similar issues arise in developed industrialized countries as well. A slight 
variant of our model can be used to establish that there are certain 
systematic biases in the nature of the innovations which are adopted; in 
particular, in Braverman-Stiglitz (1985) we present a simple model which is 
consistent with the long-standing allegation that capitalism results in the 
adoption of innovations which entail 'excessive' job routinization. 
Appendix 
In this appendix, we show how the effect of a change in technology on the 
demand for credit can be analyzed. 31 
The individual's borrowing function specifies for each realization of Y~ the 
amount which the individual will borrow, 
B=B(h;Q).  (A.1) 
The amount borrowed is a function of the individual's income and fl, some 
parameterization of the technology, which in turn will determine the 
probability distribution of Y2- 
Thus the average amount borrowed is 
B=~ B(Y~; a) dF(h;  a), (A.2) 
where F is the distribution function of Y1. We can now determine how a 
change in O changes B, i.e., 
d/~ f c~B da ~, -~dF  + ~ BdFa. (A.3) 
3°A technological innovation such as the introduction of High Yield Varieties (HYV) is often 
associated not only with higher mean yield but also with higher spread of the distribution, the 
HYV being more susceptible to bad weather and pests. However, the introduction of HYV is 
also associated with increase in input of fertilizers and effort, additional 'externalities'. Landlords 
who internalize all these externalities by interlinking contracts are less likely to resist 
technological innovations. On the internalization of such externalities through cost sharing 
arrangements of inputs, see Braverman-Stiglitz (1983b). 
3~For the concepts used here for risk analysis, see Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970). 
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In Braverman-Stiglitz (1983a) we find conditions under which we can sign 
B dFI2 (how a change in the distribution affects mean borrowing with a 
given borrowing function) and aB/df2 (how a change in the distribution of Y 
shifts the borrowing function). ~ B dFt2 depends critically on the concavity or 
convexity of the borrowing function. A mean preserving reduction in 
variability of Y1 decreases the demand for borrowing if the borrowing 
function is convex while an increase in the mean of Y1 will reduce the 
demand for borrowing. For non-convex borrowing functions the effects may 
be either convex or concave. 
How the innovation affects the probability distribution of Y~ is, of course, 
an empirical question and will vary from innovation to innovation. Often, for 
instance, the HYV of grain are characterized by both greater mean and 
greater isk. The shape of the borrowing function, on the other hand, can be 
related to some simple properties of the individual's utility function. A mean 
preserving spread in Y2 normally leads to reduced borrowing - the greater 
variability of future income leads individuals to be more conservative if there 
is decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
The total effect of a change in the distribution of Y is obtained by adding 
the two effects together. Note again that a mean preserving spread in the 
distribution of I"1 increases the demand for credit with a given borrowing 
function if the borrowing function is convex, but the corresponding change in 
Y2 shifts the borrowing function down: the net effect is ambiguous. We have 
not found plausible general restrictions in utility functions and/or the 
admissible changes in distributions, under which the sign of the change in the 
demand for credit is determinate. 
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